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Abstract: The paper analyzes the eﬀects of competitive intensity on
firms’ incentives to invest in process innovations through an experi-
ment based on two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are
followed by product market competition. An increase in the intensity
of competition is modeled as an increase in the number of firms or as
a switch from Cournot to Bertrand. The theoretical prediction is that
more intense competition is unfavorable to investments for both cases.
In the experiment it turns out that the way of modeling the intensity
of competition is essential. The theoretical prediction is confirmed for
the number eﬀects. On the other hand, the comparison of Cournot
and Bertrand shows that more intense competition is beneficial for
investments.
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1 Introduction
There is broad agreement among economists that R&D is an important driver
of economic growth. Some authors like Arrow (1962) claim that without
competitive pressure there are little incentives to invest in R&D. Others like
Schumpeter (1943) argue that some degree of monopoly power is necessary
for innovative activities.
In this paper we use specific notions of increasing competition from in-
dustrial organization to derive predictions about the eﬀects of competitive
intensity on the incentives to innovate. The predictions obtained in this
fashion are tested experimentally.
The obvious candidate for defining the intensity of competition is given by
the number of firms. However, the intensity of competition has an influence
on the decisions of firms to enter a market. Due to this endogeneity problem
it seems reasonable to consider alternative concepts. For example, one can
model the intensity of competition through the distinction between Cournot
and Bertrand, where the Bertrand case represents more intense competition.
Another possibility is given by the substitutability of products; that is, the
intensity of competition is higher when goods are closer substitutes. Further
measures are the ease of entry or the market size; that is, the easier to
enter a market or the smaller the market size the higher the intensity of
competition. Boone (2000) developed a unifying concept. He showed that
all the mentioned parametrizations of competition have a feature in common,
namely that a rise in competition increases the profits of a firm relative to
the profits of a less eﬃcient firm.
In this paper we deal with two measures of competitive intensity. First, we
consider the number of firms for a given type of product market competition.
Second, we compare Cournot and Bertrand competition for a given number
of firms. The Bertrand case represents more intense competition because it
will turn a winner-takes-all structure. This means that only the most eﬃcient
firm gets a positive profit. The ratio between the profits of the most eﬃcient
firm and the laggards is infinite under Bertrand competition, and therefore
larger than in the Cournot case, where it is finite; according to Boone (2000),
competition is thus more intense in the former case.
The theoretical literature on the subject is typically about patent races.
For instance, Lee and Wilde (1980) and Delbono and Denicolò (1991) study
the eﬀects of the number of firms on investments in such a framework. The
former analyze games of R&D competition between symmetric firms in a
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Bertrand setting. They deal with dynamic investment races and show that
the R&D eﬀort per firm grows as the number of firms increases. Delbono
and Denicolò (1991) work in a similar setting as Lee and Wilde (1980), ex-
cept that product market competition is of a Cournot type. Therefore, with
non-drastic innovations, even losers in the innovation race earn positive prof-
its. Delbono and Denicolò (1991) show that an increase in the number of
firms results in a decrease of both the R&D investment of each firm and
the total investment. In a stochastic patent race preceding product market
competition, Delbono and Denicolò (1990) directly compare investments for
Cournot and Bertrand competition. In the Bertrand case investment is un-
ambiguously higher than in the Cournot case. This eﬀect is driven by the
fact that, with more intense competition, outputs tend to be larger, so that
cost reductions are more valuable. There are also papers that investigate
the robustness of this argument with respect to the extent of product dif-
ferentiation. Bester and Petrakis (1993) show that, with suﬃciently large
horizontal product diﬀerentiation, the innovation incentive is higher under
Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.1
The empirical work on the subject also comes to ambiguous conclusions.
The early literature regarded market structure as an explanatory variable.
This is shown in the survey of Cohen and Levin (1989). However, the causal-
ity might run in the opposite direction. Innovation may aﬀect market struc-
ture because R&D involves fixed costs or because it aﬀects the pattern of firm
growth in an industry. Innovation can also aﬀect market structure indirectly,
by increasing or decreasing the eﬃcient scale of production. This endogene-
ity problem has been analyzed by the more recent literature, for example by
Aghion et al. (2005), where an inverted-U relationship between intensity of
competition and investments arises. However, due to the fact that the em-
pirical analysis is still inconclusive, it seems reasonable to use experiments as
a complementary strategy because of the flexibility when choosing variables
as exogenous or endogenous according to theoretical needs.
Contrary to the theoretical literature, there are only few experimental
studies which deal directly with the linkage between intensity of competition
and R&D investments. Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992) consider the number
eﬀects. They deal with stochastic static and dynamic patent races and show
that an increase in the group size lowers investment per firm and raises
1Bonnano and Haworth (1998) come to an even starker conclusion regarding vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
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aggregate investment. Concerning the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand
competition there is the paper of Sacco and Schmutzler (2006), where a
deterministic investment game has been analyzed and it has been shown
that greater competition induces higher investments.
This study extends the analysis of Sacco and Schmutzler (2006) by treat-
ing a further measure of the intensity of competition, namely the number
of firms. Thus, we can examine whether diﬀerent modeling methods lead
to the same theoretical and experimental results. The analysis is based on
deterministic two-stage games, where investment decisions are followed by
product market competition. In the first stage identical firms producing ho-
mogenous goods simultaneously invest in R&D, which yields a decrease in
marginal costs. In the second stage firms simultaneously choose quantities
(Cournot) or prices (Bertrand).2 The theoretical model predicts that more
intense competition is unfavorable to investments, no matter whether in-
creasing competition corresponds to an increase in the number of firms or
to the shift from Cournot to Bertrand. In the experiment it turns out that
the way of modeling the intensity of competition is relevant. An increase
in the number of firms yields lower investments. On the other hand, a shift
from Cournot to Bertrand leads to higher investments, even though this is
ineﬃcient when considering the joint profit maximization.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical
framework. Section 3 describes the experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where firms i = 1, ..., I first invest in
R&D and then compete in the product market. The demand function for
the homogenous product is given by D(p) = a−p, with a > 0. All firms i are
identical ex ante with constant marginal costs c > 0. In the first stage firms
simultaneously choose R&D investments Yi ∈ [0, c), resulting in marginal
costs ci = c − Yi.3 The cost of R&D is given by kY 2i , where k > 0. In
the second stage firms simultaneously choose quantities (Cournot) or prices
(Bertrand). We refer to the Cournot case as soft competition (SC); to the
Bertrand case as intense competition (IC).
2The set-up corresponds to Sacco and Schmutzler (2006).
3Even though agents are restricted to finite choice sets in the experiment, the theoretical
analysis is much more transparent if the choice set is a continuum.
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2.1 Soft Competition
For SC, that is, if firms compete in quantities in the second stage, backward
induction shows that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in the first stage is
given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI , α, k) =
µα+ IYi −Pi6=j Yj
I + 1
¶2
− kY 2i , (1)
where α ≡ a− c represents the demand parameter.
It is easy to see that the first term on the right-hand side of (1), namely
the gross payoﬀ of firm i, depends positively on its own investment and the
demand parameter, and negatively on the investments of the other firms.
Competition is soft in the sense that, even investing less than the others, a
firm achieves a positive gross payoﬀ, as long as the numerator of the gross
payoﬀ term is positive.
The maximization of (1) with respect to Yi yields
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
=
2I(α+ IYi −
P
i6=j Yj)
(I + 1)2
− 2kYi ≡ 0. (2)
The assumption in the following is that the second order condition holds,
that is,
∂2Πi(·)
∂Y 2i
=
I2
(I + 1)2
− k < 0, (3)
which is fulfilled for arbitrary I ≥ 2 if k > 1.
The equilibrium follows immediately from (2).
Proposition 1 Under SC the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in-
vestment levels are
Y SC =
αI
k(I + 1)2 − I . (4)
It is straightforward to check from (4) that the equilibrium investment
levels are increasing in the demand parameter α, and decreasing in the cost
parameter k and in the number of firms I.
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2.2 Intense Competition
For IC, that is, if firms compete in prices in the second stage, it results from
backward induction that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in the first stage is
given by
Πi(·) =
½
(Yi − Y m−i)D(c− Y m−i)− kY 2i , if Yi > Y m−i
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y m−i
, (5)
where Y m−i = maxj 6=i Yj.
Competition is intense in the sense that a firm can achieve a positive gross
payoﬀ only by investing more than the highest investment of the others.
If Yi > Y m−i , the maximization of (5) with respect to Yi leads to
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
= D(c− Y mj )− 2kYi ≡ 0. (6)
If Yi ≤ Y m−i , then clearly Yi = 0 holds. If firm i does not invest more than
the highest investment of the others, it gets a negative net payoﬀ. In such a
case the deviation to Yi = 0 is profitable.
Note that the concavity condition is fulfilled for k > 0. The equilibrium
is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 Under IC, for k > 1
2
, there are multiple asymmetric equilib-
ria with one firm investing Y ICi =
α
2k and firms j 6= i investing Y ICj = 0.
Proof. If firms j 6= i invest Y ICj = 0, then according to (6) the best
response of firm i is Y ICi =
α
2k for any k > 0. If firm i invests Y
IC
i =
α
2k ,
then the best response of the other firms is Y ICj = 0 for k >
1
2
. That is, firm
j does not have an incentive to exceed the investment of firm i by choosing
Y ICj =
α
2k +∆, where ∆ > 0. The value ∆ =
α
4k2 maximizes Πj(·) which is
negative for k > 1
2
. This concludes the proof.
The non-existence of symmetric pure strategy equilibria for IC makes it
unlikely that agents coordinate on an equilibrium. Nevertheless, we chose the
set-up because it is a particularly clear way of modeling intense competition.
It is easy to see from Proposition 2 that the average equilibrium invest-
ment level is given by
Y
IC
=
α
2kI
, (7)
which is increasing in the demand parameter, and decreasing in the cost
parameter k and in the number of firms I.
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2.3 The Eﬀects of Increasing Competition
By defining the intensity of competition through the number of firms we have
seen that more intense competition has a negative eﬀect on the incentives to
invest.
Corollary 1 For a given type of product market competition, SC or IC, the
average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I.
In analogy to that, comparing (4) to (7), the following result arises.
Corollary 2 Suppose that (3) holds and k > 1
2
. The average equilibrium
investment for SC is higher than the average investment in each asymmetric
pure strategy equilibrium for IC if and only if I ≥ 3 or I = 2 and k < 2.
We therefore have that for a given number of firms, except for the case
with I = 2 and k ≥ 2, a switch from SC to IC reduces average investments.
Again, an increase in competition is unfavorable to the incentives to invest.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Choosing the Parameters
We conducted four experimental sessions: Two of them correspond to SC and
two to IC. For both SC and IC there was a session with two-player groups
(SC2 and IC2) and one with four-player groups (SC4 and IC4). Further, we
chose the parameters α = 30 and k = 3. In the case of SC with continuous
investment choices the equilibria (2.4, 2.4) and (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69) arise for
SC2 and SC4, respectively. On the one hand, according to Proposition 1,
investment per firm decreases in the number of firms; it is maximal in the
monopoly case. On the other hand, total investment increases if competition
is more intense. According to Proposition 2, there are asymmetric equilibria
for IC with continuous investment choices, each with one firm investing 5
and the other firm(s) investing 0.
However, in the experimental sessions, we restricted the investment choice
set to Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. Under SC, it can be shown that the equilibria of
the game with the discrete choice set are (2, 2) and (2, 2, 2, 2) for SC2 and
SC4, respectively. Under IC, equilibrium investments are not aﬀected by the
change of the choice set.
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These four sessions allow to analyze the eﬀect of the intensity of com-
petition on the incentives to invest in R&D in two diﬀerent ways. First,
according to Corollary 1, for a given type of product market competition we
can look at the eﬀect of increasing the number of players on investments.
Second, according to Corollary 2, for a given number of players we can ex-
amine changes in the investment behavior by considering the switch from SC
to IC.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted in June and November 2006 at
the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students.4
The games implemented in the experiment are reduced form versions of
the described two-stage games. To focus on investment choices, we reduced
the games to the first stage, that is, to the investment stage. We did not
model the product market stage explicitly, avoiding the chance of an influence
of the second stage on the first one. For each investment profile, players
earned the unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the corresponding subgame.
In the first two sessions we implemented the IC treatments, in the last two
the SC treatments. In each session there were 20 periods and in two of four
sessions 36 subjects.5 This led to a total of 2760 investment observations.
No subject participated in more than one session. The participants were
randomly matched into groups of size two or four after each period. This
corresponds to a Stranger design.6 At the end of each period subjects were
informed about the investment level of the other group member(s) and their
own net payoﬀ for that period. In each session participants received an
initial endowment of CHF 35 (≈US$ 28).7 Average earnings including the
endowment were CHF 31 (≈US$ 25) and CHF 32.50 (≈US$ 26) for IC2 and
IC4, respectively. The amounts were CHF 49 (≈US$ 39) and CHF 39 (≈US$
31) for SC2 and SC4, respectively. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes each.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1999).
4We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
5In the SC4 and IC2 sessions there were 32 and 34 participants, respectively.
6Observe that through the choice of a Stranger design the experimental analysis is
based on one-shot considerations.
7The instructions are available upon request.
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3.3 Results
In this section the number eﬀects are first analyzed. That is, for a given
type of product market competition we consider the eﬀects of increasing the
number of players on investments. The analysis of the SC treatment precedes
that of the IC treatment. Second, for a given number of players, we take the
switch from SC to IC into account.
3.3.1 Soft Competition
Given SC, we analyze the eﬀects of increasing the number of players from
I = 2 to I = 4 on the investment behavior. The theoretical prediction
based on the discrete choice set is that each firm chooses the investment
level of 2. That is, the mean investment level for SC2 is the same as for
SC4 (Y
SC2
= Y
SC4
= 2). The experiment does not provide evidence for this
prediction.
Result 1 Mean investments are higher for SC2 than for SC4.
<Figure 1 here>
Considering all periods, both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon
rank sum test show that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly
significant (p < 0.01). This also holds in the last five periods. That is, the
mean investment level under SC2 does not converge to that under SC4.
Figure 1 reveals that there is overinvestment for SC2 and underinvest-
ment for SC4. In the SC2 treatment the diﬀerence between investments and
Nash equilibrium is highly significant over all periods. This also holds in the
last five periods. In the SC4 treatment the diﬀerence with respect to the
prediction is likewise highly significant throughout the 20 periods. Interest-
ingly, this also holds in the last five but not in the first five periods. It is
important to note that, even though the experiment does not provide evi-
dence for the prediction based on the discrete choice set, it does considering
the continuous choice set. The fact that theoretically the two-player case
yields higher per capita investments than the four-player case (2.4 > 1.69)
emerges experimentally.
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A further interesting aspect concerns the heterogeneity of player behavior.
One way to analyze heterogeneity is to consider the spread of investment
choices. This is shown in Result 2.
Result 2 The spread of the investment choices, defined as the diﬀerence
between the maximum and the minimum investment level within a group, is
higher on average for SC4 than for SC2.
<Figure 2 here>
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that with exception of period 11 and 14 the
mean spread is higher when competition is more intense. Both under SC2
and SC4 the diﬀerence to the equilibrium spread of 0 is highly significant
over all periods.
Another way to analyze heterogeneity is to consider the investment dis-
tribution. Over all periods the properties for SC2 and SC4 are summarized
in Result 3.
Result 3 For SC2 the following holds: The equilibrium investment level of
2 is the most chosen, followed by 3.
For SC4 the following holds: 2 is the most chosen investment level, fol-
lowed by 1.
<Figure 3 here>
The investment distributions are highly concentrated. Figure 3 reveals
that in the SC2 treatment the investment level of 2 is played in 43% of the
cases and that 3 is chosen in 34% of the cases. The Nash equilibrium with
both subjects in a group investing 2 arises in 59 of the 360 one-shot games.8
Further, one fourth of the subjects plays 2 in at least 16 of the 20 periods;
four participants choose 2 in each period.
In the SC4 treatment the investment level of 2 is played in 47% of the
cases and 1 is chosen in 33% of the cases. The Nash equilibrium with each
820 periods times 18 groups per period yields 360.
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subject investing 2 arises in 12 of the 160 one-shot games.9 Moreover, one
fourth of the subjects plays 2 in at least 15 of the 20 periods.
The properties contained in Result 3 also hold in individual periods. Un-
der SC2 the investment level of 2 is chosen most often in 17 periods, followed
by 3. In the remaining three periods 3 is the most frequently played invest-
ment level, followed by 2. Under SC4, again in 17 periods, 2 is mostly chosen,
followed by 1. In the other three periods 1 is mostly played, followed by 2.
To analyze if the heterogeneity is due to individual investment patterns,
one can examine the distribution of the average investments per subject.
<Table 1 here>
For each interval of length 1, Table 1 gives the number of subjects whose
average investment is in the interval, both under SC2 and SC4. We see
that the high concentration of the investment distributions is clearly due
to individual patterns. For SC2 there are 28 subjects of 36 whose mean
investment over the 20 periods lies between 2 and 3. For SC4 there are 20
subjects of 32 with a mean investment that lies between 1 and 2.
3.3.2 Intense Competition
Given IC, the eﬀects of increasing the number of players from I = 2 to I = 4
on investments are considered. The theoretical analysis shows that there are
asymmetric equilibria, each with one firm investing 5 and the other firm(s)
investing 0. That is, the mean investment level for IC2 (Y
IC2
= 2.5) is
higher than for IC4 (Y
IC4
= 1.25). The experiment provides evidence for
this prediction.
Result 4 Mean investments are higher for IC2 than for IC4.
<Figure 4 here>
920 periods times 8 groups per period yields 160.
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Both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show
that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly significant over all
periods. Figure 4 reveals that the mean investment level under IC2 does
not approach the one under IC4. Like in the case involving all periods the
diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly significant when taking into
account either the last ten periods or the last five.
According to Corollary 1, the experimental analysis confirms the fact
that, both for SC and IC, mean investments are decreasing in the number of
agents. This has been shown in Result 1 and 4. This contrasts the findings
of other settings like those discussed by Huck et al. (2004) for which cooper-
ative behavior is more likely when the number of players is small; one might
therefore expect in our context where investments have negative externalities
on the other players less incentives to invest in the two-player than in the
four-player case. Though, one must keep in mind that, due to the choice of
a Stranger design, it is unlikely that cooperative behavior arises. However,
by looking at the IC treatment another eﬀect seems to dominate. Under IC2
subjects invest more because of a risk argument. That is, the probability of
getting a positive gross payoﬀ by investing more than the other(s) is higher
for IC2 than IC4.
Figure 4 also shows that, both under IC2 and IC4, the mean investments
over the 20 periods always lie above the Nash equilibrium values of 2.5 and
1.25, respectively.
In the IC2 treatment the diﬀerence between investments and Nash equi-
librium is highly significant throughout the 20 periods. This still holds when
considering either the last ten periods or the last five. That is, there is no
convergence to the Nash equilibrium value of 2.5, even though the invest-
ments in the first ten periods are significantly higher than those in the last
ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.016).
In the IC4 treatment, considering all periods, a regression over a constant
shows that the diﬀerence between investments and Nash equilibrium is highly
significant. In contrast to that, a Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates high
significance only in the first five periods (p = 0.01). However, the investments
in the first ten periods are not significantly higher than those in the last ten
periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.146). Again, there is no convergence
to the Nash equilibrium value of 1.25. Considering the last five periods a
Wilcoxon rank sum test shows significance at the 4%-level.
Another way to analyze the overinvestment feature is to look at the per-
centage deviation from the Nash equilibrium in both treatments.
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<Figure 5 here>
Inspection of Figure 5 shows that the percentage deviations from the
theoretical predictions are similar in most periods. In certain periods the
deviation is higher for IC4 but there is no significant diﬀerence. We can
therefore claim that in both treatments there is the same investment behavior
in relation to the Nash prediction.
The next three results refer to the heterogeneity of player behavior.10
Result 5 The spread of the investment choices is higher on average for IC4
than for IC2.
<Figure 6 here>
By considering Figure 6 we see that with few exceptions the mean spread
for IC4 lies between 4 and 6 and that for IC2 between 2 and 4. Under IC4
the mean spread is below the equilibrium spread of 5 in 15 of the 20 periods.
Over all periods the diﬀerence is highly significant.
Due to the coordination problem related to the asymmetric equilibria, it
is interesting to look at the investment distributions. The properties when
considering all periods are summarized in Result 6.
Result 6 For IC2 the following holds: The investment distribution exhibits
a global maximum at 5. There is a local maximum at 0.
For IC4 the following holds: The investment distribution exhibits a global
maximum at 0. There is a local maximum at 5.
<Figure 7 here>
10This heterogeneity explains why the result for IC4 regarding the diﬀerence between
investments and Nash equilibrium obtained by a regression over a constant is not supported
by a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
12
The prediction for IC2 is that the investment levels of 0 and 5 are played
in 50% of the cases, respectively. Inspection of Figure 7 reveals that in the
IC2 treatment 5 is chosen in 24% of the cases and that 0 is played in 15% of
the cases. The Nash equilibrium with one subject investing 5 and the other
0 arises in 24 of the 340 one-shot games.11
The prediction for IC4 is that the investment level of 0 is played in 75%
and that of 0 in 25 % of the cases. Figure 7 shows that in the IC4 treatment
0 is chosen in 44% of the cases; thereby one fourth of the participants plays
0 in at least 15 of the 20 periods. Three subjects play 0 in every period. The
distribution over the other investment levels exhibits another local maximum
at 5 which is chosen in 17% of the cases. The Nash equilibrium with one
subject investing 5 and the others 0 arises in 14 of the 180 one-shot games.12
It is important to note that, though the frequency with which 0 and 5
are played is lower than predicted, the subjects understand the incentives of
the IC game. For example, under IC4, the investment level of 0 is chosen in
almost half of the cases, which shows that the participants are aware of the
low probability of getting a positive gross payoﬀ.
Surprisingly, in spite of the coordination problem, the properties summa-
rized in Result 6 also hold in individual periods. This is shown in Result
7.
Result 7 For IC2 the following holds: In 19 periods the investment distri-
bution exhibits a global maximum at 4 or 5. In 15 periods there is a local
maximum at 0.
For IC4 the following holds: In each period the investment distribution
exhibits a global maximum at 0. In each period there is a local maximum at
4 or 5.
The next observation refers to the distribution of the average investments
per subject.
<Table 2 here>
By considering Table 2 we see that for IC4 the heterogeneity reflects
individual behavioral patterns. Except for the fact that the global maximum
11Observe that 20 periods times 17 groups per period yields 340.
1220 periods times 9 groups per period yields 180.
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arises in the interval [1, 2) and not in [0, 1), the distribution of the average
investments is similar to the distribution shown in Figure 7. For IC2 the same
holds. Except the interval [0, 1), where a local maximum does not emerge,
the distribution is similar to that of Figure 7.
The last point concerns the investments of the leaders, that is of those
with the highest investment within a group. Because of the asymmetric
equilibria it is interesting to look at this aspect.
<Figure 8 here>
Figure 8 shows that both for IC2 and IC4 the mean investments of the
leaders are close to 5 throughout the 20 periods, which is consistent with the
prediction.
3.3.3 Soft versus Intense Competition
In the following we analyze the eﬀects of switching from SC to IC on the
investment behavior for a given number of players. We first treat the two-
player case. Theoretically, the mean investment level for SC2 (Y
SC2
= 2) is
lower than for IC2 (Y
IC2
= 2.5). The experiment provides evidence for this
prediction.
Result 8 Mean investments are higher for IC2 than for SC2.
<Figure 9 here>
Over all periods the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly sig-
nificant. Figure 9 shows that the mean investment level under IC2 does not
approach the one under SC2. Even in the last five periods the diﬀerence
remains highly significant.
The overinvestment feature both for IC2 and SC2 has already been dis-
cussed. In addition to that, it is relevant to point out that the deviation from
the equilibrium is more pronounced under IC2.
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<Figure 10 here>
As revealed in Figure 10, in each period the mean investment level in the
IC2 treatment exceeds the corresponding equilibrium value more than the
mean investment level under SC2 does. The diﬀerence is highly significant
when taking into account either all periods or the last five periods.
The next result concerns the heterogeneity aspect.
Result 9 The spread of the investment choices is higher on average for IC2
than for SC2.
<Figure 11 here>
Over all periods the diﬀerence is highly significant. The diversity regard-
ing the investment distributions is shown in Figure 12.
<Figure 12 here>
The last results are related to the four-player case. The theoretical pre-
diction is that the mean investment level for SC4 (Y
SC4
= 2) is higher than
for IC4 (Y
IC4
= 1.25). The experiment does not provide evidence for this
prediction.
Result 10 Mean investments are higher for IC4 than for SC4.
<Figure 13 here>
By considering Figure 13 we see that with exception of period 18 and 19
the mean investment level is higher if competition is more intense. Taking
into account all periods a regression over a constant shows that the diﬀerence
between the two treatments is highly significant. Contrary, a Wilcoxon rank
sum test indicates significance at the 10%-level only in the first ten periods.
The mean investment level under IC4 seems to converge to that under SC4.
However, a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test lead
15
to diﬀerent results. Considering the last five periods, the former shows no
significant diﬀerence between the two treatments, whereas the latter exhibits
significance at the 4%-level.
The important aspect of Result 8 and 10 is the fact that, by defining the
intensity of competition through the switch from SC to IC instead of the
number of agents, the experimental results are reversed. That is, in contrast
to Result 1 and 4, more intense competition leads to higher mean investments.
This is driven by the fact that in the IC treatment only investing more than
the others leads to positive gross payoﬀs.
Last, the heterogeneity of subjects’ investment behavior is briefly dis-
cussed.13
Result 11 The spread of the investment choices is higher on average for IC4
than for SC4.
<Figure 14 here>
The diﬀerence is highly significant when considering either all periods or
the first five periods. It is interesting to note that mean spreads are higher
when competition is more intense in each of the considered cases.
Further, Figure 15 shows the investment distributions.
<Figure 15 here>
Concluding, it is important to observe that all results regarding SC4 and
IC4 confirm the findings of Sacco and Schmutzler (2006). There, for the four-
player case, the intensity of competition is modeled through the comparison
of Cournot and Bertrand competition.
13Again, due to the heterogeneity of the investment choices, the statistical analysis
regarding Result 10 is not unique.
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3.3.4 Investments’ Eﬃciency
We have seen that, with the exception of SC4, all treatments have an over-
investment feature in common. An interesting point to analyze is to what
extent behavior deviates from eﬃciency. One way to do that is to relate the
joint net payoﬀs realized in the experimental sessions to the maximal joint
net payoﬀs. For IC the maximal joint net payoﬀ is given by equilibrium.
Due to the fact that the equilibrium strategy has one player investing and
considering that this player maximizes his own net payoﬀ by choosing the
investment level of 5, it follows that also the joint net payoﬀ is maximal. On
the other hand, under SC, the equilibrium case with all players investing 2
does not maximize the joint net payoﬀ. For SC2 it can be shown that the
maximal joint net payoﬀ arises when the two players choose the investment
level of 1; under SC4 when one player chooses 1 and the others 0.
To look at the investments’ eﬃciency the following measure called eﬃ-
ciency rate (ER) can be used:
ER =
Mean Joint Net Payoﬀ
Maximal Joint Net Payoﬀ
.
The ER considers the joint net payoﬀ over all periods and groups in
relation to the maximal joint net payoﬀ. For IC negative values emerge,
which signalize ineﬃciency. Under IC2 a value of −0.69 arises; under IC4
−0.87. That is, the overinvestment feature does not have beneficial eﬀects
on net payoﬀs. The participants made losses over the 20 periods. In the
IC2 treatment, 22 of the 34 subjects earned a negative net payoﬀ in at least
14 periods. In the IC4 treatment, 13 of the 36 subjects earned a negative
net payoﬀ in at least 13 periods. No subject earned more than the initial
endowment at the end of the IC sessions. On the other hand, the SC cases
are relatively eﬃcient. The SC2 treatment leads to an ER of 0.91. For SC4
the value is 0.77. Each participant earned more than the initial endowment.
4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of increasing the intensity of competition
on investment incentives in an experiment where a reduced form version of a
simple two-stage R&D model has been implemented. In the first stage firms
whose marginal costs are identical ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D.
17
The investment leads to a decrease in marginal costs. In the second stage of
the game firms simultaneously choose quantities or prices in a homogenous
good market.
The intensity of competition has been modeled in two ways. First, as an
increase of the number of firms for a given type of product market competi-
tion. The theoretical prediction is that, both for SC and IC, an increase in
the number of agents yields lower mean investments. This fact is confirmed
by the experimental results. Mean investments are higher for a smaller num-
ber of players. Even though investments have a negative externality on the
other agents, there is no cooperative behavior in the two-player case. With
exception of the SC4 treatment the other three sessions have led to over-
investments which are in the IC case ineﬃcient when considering the joint
profit maximization.
Second, the intensity of competition has been modeled through the com-
parison of Cournot and Bertrand for a given number of players. Thereby,
Bertrand competition has a winner-takes-all structure and therefore repre-
sents more intense competition. Again, it results theoretically that, with
exception of a particular case, higher intensity of competition is unfavorable
to investments. The experimental results are interesting because they reverse
the ones obtained in the case which refers to the number of players as a mea-
sure of the intensity of competition. That is, mean investments are higher
for intense competition than for soft competition. This holds both for two
and four players.
Interestingly, both for SC and IC the heterogeneity of the investment
distributions largely reflects the one across individuals. Even in the IC treat-
ment where the coordination on equilibria is obviously diﬃcult due to the
choice of a game with multiple asymmetric equilibria, stable behavioral pat-
terns emerge early on.
Robustness checks are conceivable. For example one could model increas-
ing competition through increasing substitutability and see what experimen-
tal results arise. Further, it would also be interesting to test a model like that
of Aghion et al. (2005) which predicts an inverted-U relationship between
intensity of competition and investments.
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Figure 3: Investment distributions.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9)
SC2 0 1 28 6 1 0 0 0 0
SC4 2 20 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Subject distributions.
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Figure 4: Mean investments.
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Figure 7: Investment distributions.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9)
IC2 1 1 6 6 11 6 2 1 0
IC4 8 9 7 4 7 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Subject distributions.
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